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TORTS- Workers’ Compensation 
 
Summary 
  
An appeal of an Eighth Judicial District Court’s summary judgment in a tort action 
against a former employer and co-employees based on the exclusivity provisions of the workers’ 
compensation statutes that arose around the time of employment termination. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
  
The Court reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case 
“because there [were] genuine issues of material fact as to whether [the] injuries arose out of and 
in the course of… employment, and thus, whether they were covered by workers’ 
compensation.” 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Riverside Resort and Casino employed Juana Fanders as a guest room attendant.  When 
Riverside called Fanders to the human resource office and confronted her with a coworker’s 
accusation of inappropriate language, Fanders became angry and quit her job.  Riverside 
instructed Fanders to sign termination papers and security guards told her they would escort her 
off the premises.  However, the human resources director had instructed the security guards to 
“86” Fanders from the property, which in part meant taking Fanders’ picture.  To avoid having 
her picture taken without knowing why, Fanders climbed under a table.  Fanders alleged a guard 
grabbed “her by her hair, pulled her out from under the table, and called her a derogatory name.  
The parties agree[d] that Fanders was then handcuffed and placed in a holding cell….” 
 
 Fanders filed a civil complaint including several tortious claims
2
 against Riverside and 
the security guards.  The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Fanders’ 
injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment at Riverside, and therefore the 
workers’ compensation statutes, found in the Nevada Industrial Insurance Act (NIIA), were 
Fanders’ exclusive remedy.  The district court granted summary judgment; Fanders appealed. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The Nevada Supreme Court, which reviews summary judgment de novo, noted that a 
district court should only grant summary judgment if the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law and if there are no genuine issues of material facts.
3
   
 
Because the NIIA is the exclusive remedy for injuries that arise out of and in the course 
of employment,
4
 the threshold question in this case was whether Fanders’ injuries arose out of 
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 Summarized by Bracken Longhurst 
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 Fanders raised claims of assault and battery, vicarious liability, wrongful imprisonment, negligence, and punitive 
damages. 
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 Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). 
and in the course of her employment.  Injuries occur within the course of employment when the 
nature of the work or workplace causes or contributes to the risk of the injury.  The NIIA 
generally does not apply to injuries that occur after the employment relationship ends, however, 
some courts recognize exceptions to this rule.  The court agreed with the reasoning of the Texas 
appellate court decision Sanders v. Texas Employers Insurance Ass’n,5  and held that “when an 
injury is the result of an inherent hazard of the employment or occurs in the course of conducting 
the termination, workers’ compensation may apply to injuries sustained after the employment 
relationship is terminated.” 
 
In this case, the record left several factual issues unresolved.  Was the employment 
relationship severed?
6
  Did Fanders know about the 86 policy?  What was the 86 policy 
regarding employees?  Was Fanders at increased risk of being subjected to the 86 procedure due 
to employment, or does the public at large face the same risk?  Was the 86 procedure incidental 
to termination?  The determination of these questions were material in deciding if Fanders’ 
injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment, and therefore summary judgment was 
not appropriate. 
 
On remand, the district court must determine if Fanders’ injuries arose out of and in the 
course of employment.  If Fanders’ injuries did not arise out of and in the course of employment,  
the district court must consider the merits of Fanders’ claims.  However, if the injuries did arise 
out of and in the course of employment, the NIIA is likely Fanders’ exclusive remedy, with a 
few possible exceptions.  The court must determine if Fanders’ claims meet any exceptions and 
therefore fall outside of the NIIA based on applicable Nevada law.  The Court has recognized an 
exception to the NIIA exclusivity provision when an employer “deliberately and specifically 
intended to injure [the employee].”7  Furthermore, consistent with the court’s decision in Wood,8 
the court held “that when a plaintiff states a viable intentional tort claim against a co-employee, 
that claim is not barred by the NIIA’s exclusivity provisions.” 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The NIIA exclusivity provision does not bar tort claims against employers when an 
employer “deliberately and specifically intended to injure [the employee];” nor does the NIIA 
bar intentional torts claims against co-employees. 
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 NEV. REV. STAT. § 616C.150(1) (2007). 
5
 775 S.W.2d 762 (Tex. App. 1989). 
6
 Fanders claimed she signed the termination papers and Riverside neither conceded nor denied it.  No papers were 
included in the record. 
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 Conway v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc., 116 Nev. 870, 875, 8 P.3d 836, 840 (2000) 
 
